Philosophy and the Matrix - Introduction (2)

UPDATE: MARCH 20, 2003

As promised, we are pleased to offer five new essays tackling philosophical themes that arise in The Matrix.

Starting things off is a piece by the epistemologist and philosopher of mind James Pryor. He's contributed a lively essay that will be of particular interest to those coming to philosophy for the first time. In "What's So Bad About Living in The Matrix?" he explores and criticizes two tempting but problematic philosophical positions: the view that there can't be facts which it's impossible for us to know about (sometimes called verificationism), and the view that everyone's motive for acting is always to have nicer experiences. Employing examples from both the film and imaginary thought-experiments, Pryor tries to show that these positions, which can often initially seem irresistible to students, are not as straightforward or as satisfying as they might first appear. He then goes on to argue (in sympathy with Vasiliou’s essay) that the worst thing about living in the Matrix would not be the metaphysical or epistemological limitations such a scenario would impose, it would instead be the political constraints: those trapped in the Matrix have constraints on their action that most of us deeply value not having.

David Chalmers is a philosopher from the University of Arizona and author of numerous books and articles on the philosophy of mind, including the influential volume The Conscious Mind. In his essay "The Matrix as Metaphysics," he suggests that while we cannot rule out the possibility that we are in a system like the Matrix, this possibility is not as bad as we might have thought. He argues against the intuitive view that if we are in a matrix, we are deluded about the external world. Instead, he suggests that if we are in a matrix, we should regard this as telling us about the nature of the external world: the physical world is ultimately made of bits, and was created by beings who ensured that our minds interact with this physical world. Chalmers's surprising conclusion is that even if we are living in a Matrix-like simulation, most of our beliefs about the world are still true.

Julia Driver, a moral philosopher from Dartmouth College and author of Uneasy Virtue, explores some of the distinctively ethical issues that arise in The Matrix in her essay "Artificial Ethics." Driver begins by using the film to consider the moral status of artificially created beings: she argues that, given certain assumptions regarding the nature of consciousness, rationality, and personhood, we ought to regard artificial intelligences such as Agent Smith as creatures that deserve genuine moral consideration. In the second part of her essay Driver tackles the thorny philosophical question of whether one can behave immorally when in “non-veridical” (illusory) circumstances. Noting the implausibility of attributing wrongdoing to those who perform seemingly immoral acts in a dream, she argues that, to the extent that the Matrix offers a similarly illusory world free of actual unpleasant effects on others, it also seems odd to attribute wrongdoing to agents acting in such a world. However, drawing on insights from the first part of her essay, Driver concludes that we have good reasons to think that actions in the Matrix would have genuine effects on both humans and some artificial creatures, and thus the world of the Matrix, like our world, has its own moral norms — its own ethics — that ought to be both acknowledged and respected.

Michael McKenna, a philosopher at Ithaca College who specializes in the philosophical problems of freedom and moral responsibility, offers up a comprehensive yet light-hearted exploration of the free will problem in his essay "Neo's Freedom ... Whoa!". Ingeniously utilizing aspects of The Matrix to describe and explore the traditional positions taken in debates over free will, McKenna manages to cover a lot of ground: determinism, fatalism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism are all canvassed and compared through the unique perspective afforded us by the film. He then goes on to explore the attractiveness of the radical freedom that Neo appears to have achieved by the end of The Matrix. Does such absolute freedom indeed “rock” the way we naturally think it would? McKenna convincingly argues that total freedom of this sort offers too much of a good thing: part of the joy we take in exercising our freedom is in pushing boundaries and testing limits — if all boundaries and limitations are removed, the possibility for such joy will disappear as well.

Finally, we have an essay from John Partridge, a professor of philosophy at Wheaton College whose work focuses on the philosophy of the ancient Greeks. In "Plato's Cave & The Matrix," Partridge considers the striking similarities between The Matrix and the "cave" scenario described in Plato’s Republic. In addition to pointing out the numerous surface parallels between the cave-dwellers Plato describes and the humans trapped in the Matrix, Partridge explores a deeper continuity between the film and Plato’s text: both narratives privilege the self-knowledge that follows from the right kind of self-examination. As Plato might put it, both Neo and the cave-dwellers must undertake a difficult journey from darkness to light if genuine knowledge (and consequently true "care of the soul") is to be attained.

Enjoy this new group of essays, and be sure and check back soon for further updates.

Chris Grau, Editor

哲学与《黑客帝国》-简介 二

更新：2003年3月20日

按照原计划，我们很高兴再次发表五篇讨论《黑客帝国》中的哲学主题的文章。

首先介绍认识论专家和思想哲学家James Pryor。他的文章生动活泼，对于那些第一次接触哲学的读者更有吸引力。在《活在矩阵中为什么这么糟糕》中，作者阐述并批评了两种听起来不错但实际上并非如此的哲学观点：第一是不存在不能被验证的事实（或者叫验证主义），第二是每个人的动机都是为了更好的体验。通过援引影片中的和假想的例子，Pryor试图向我们展示这些让学生们难以拒绝的观点并不是像它们看起来那么直接或者那么令人满意。与Vasiliou的观点不同，他认为，对生活在矩阵中的人们来说，最糟糕的并不是形而上学的或者认识论上的局限性，而是政治上的约束：他们的行动受到诸多限制，而这种限制正是我们的价值观所无法忍受的。

David Chalmers是一位亚利桑那大学的哲学家，其作品多与思想哲学有关，最有影响力的当数《有意识的思想》。在他的文章《《黑客帝国》的形而上学》中，作者认为，虽然我们不能排除我们就置身在一个矩阵中的可能性，但是这却并不像我们想象的那么糟糕。他并不认同那种如果我们在矩阵中我们就是被外部世界所迷惑的观点。相反，他认为如果我们在矩阵中，这正是在向我们诉说外部世界的真相：物质世界归根结底是由比特流所构成的，而造物主所要做的就是确保我们的思想和物质世界存在相互作用。Chalmer所得出的惊人的结论就是，即使我们就生活在类似矩阵的模拟环境中，我们中的绝大多数人还是会相信这个世界的真实性的。

《令人不安的美德》一书的作者Julia Driver是一位来自达特茅斯学院的道德哲学家，在文章《人工伦理》中，她探讨了影片所提出的一些独特的伦理问题。在文章第一部分，作者通过影片引入了人造生物的道德状态问题。在对意识、理性和人性的本质做出某些基本假定之后，作者认为，我们应该认为即使探员史密斯这样的人工智能创造物也应该考虑道德问题。在文章第二部分中，作者涉及了一个棘手的哲学问题，即在一个“无法验证的”（假想的）环境中，人能否违背道德准则行事？作者注意到，我们是不能因为某人在梦中行为不道德而怪罪他的，因此，鉴于矩阵仅仅提供了模拟世界而并未对他人造成真实的伤害，我们因此而怪罪这个虚拟世界中的探员史密斯们似乎也是不应该的。但是，回应文章的第一部分，作者得出结论，我们有充分的理由认为矩阵的行为不仅影响了人类，也影响了人工造物，因此与我们的世界一样，矩阵世界也有其特有的道德规范——其特有的伦理——这种规范应该得到双方的认可和尊重。

Michael McKenna是一位Ithaca学院的哲学家，专长为自由和道德责任的哲学问题。他的文章《Neo的自由……哇噻！》以严谨而不失轻松的笔触探讨了自由意志的问题。以《黑客帝国》这部影片来描述和探索自由意志这个争论已久的问题，McKenna可以说是第一人。他的文章涵盖范围很广，通过影片所提供的独特视角对决定论、宿命论、相容主义和不相容主义都进行了阐述和比较。接下来他提到了影片最后Neo所获得的绝对自由是多么的吸引人。这种绝对自由真的像我们认为的那么好吗？作者认为，过犹不及。现有的自由带给我们的乐趣之一就是开疆扩土和挑战极限——如果所有的限制都不存在了，那么这种乐趣也就不存在了。

最后，让我们来看看Wheaton学院精研古希腊哲学的哲学教授John Partridge的文章《柏拉图洞穴和《黑客帝国》》。作者注意到这部影片和柏拉图的《理想国》中所描述的洞穴理论之间惊人的相似之处。作者不仅仅看到了柏拉图所描述的穴居者和生活在矩阵中的人们在表面上的诸多相似之处，更看到影片和柏拉图的理论两者在深层次上的一脉相承：他们都认为，只有以正确的方式自省，才可能有正确的自知。柏拉图也许会说，不论Neo还是穴居者，都需要经过从黑暗到光明的痛苦历程，才可能取得真经，并随之大彻大悟。

希望大家喜欢这一集的文章，别忘了关注我们下一步的更新。