返回正常中文阅读
想对这篇译文“指手画脚”吗？
大错 
小错 
不顺 
建议 The regulators are coming
[2008.03.29] The regulators are coming
Banking
The regulators are coming
Mar 27th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Now that investment banking is backed by the state, it needs re-regulating. Carefully
THE task of making financiers pay for their mistakes would tax St Peter himself. Last week this newspaper applauded the Federal Reserve\'s decision to put $30 billion of public money behind JPMorgan Chase\'s rescue of stricken Bear Stearns (see article): not only did it stop a systemic collapse, it heaped most of the pain on Bear\'s investors, who received a mere $2 a share. But on March 24th, after howls from those investors, JPMorgan increased its offer to $10 a share—an extra $1 billion or so. Taxpayers have every reason to feel aggrieved. Without help from the Fed, Bear\'s shareholders might well have received nothing at all, and yet the state is stuck at the back of the queue—guaranteeing a $29 billion slug of Bear\'s worst assets (see article).
That is just the start. The Fed has signalled that it will now stand behind investment banks like Bear, and it has agreed to provide emergency lending to them for the first time since the Depression. The banks\' share prices duly rallied. Sharp minds up and down Wall Street must be sitting down to work out how to turn the state\'s new commitments to their advantage.
Finance, like any other industry, is chiefly regulated by people taking responsibility for their actions. Ideally, the market keeps score: although you cannot legislate for luck, successful financiers tend to get rich and unsuccessful ones go bust. But what do you do when risk and reward are skewed? When Bear\'s shareholders gain at the taxpayer\'s expense? Or when the other investment bankers and their shareholders take on that extra bit of risk, knowing that they keep all the gains, but that the state will shoulder some of the losses?
A tempting answer is that the state should refuse to help. But its hands are tied: Bear is so entangled in the market that leaving it to fail would have caught others up in the mayhem and multiplied the harm. Taxpayers have an interest in upholding the general rule that each business must stand alone—but not when that business\'s fall would wreck the financial system and threaten their own livelihoods. Even if the Fed had joined Bear shareholders in eking out better terms from JPMorgan, as it should have, the state\'s pretence that it could walk away would have convinced nobody. As Jimmy Cayne, Bear\'s bridge-mad chairman, might say, it had a weak hand.
Equally tempting—and just as wrong—is the idea that, with enough new rules, the state can ensure that a crisis never happens again. Wrong, because it flies in the face of five centuries of financial booms and busts. Civil servants, however dedicated, cannot outwit the combined forces of the world\'s bankers. And it is through risk-taking and innovation that banks benefit the economy (finance does that too, remember).
That leaves the regulators with a balance to strike. In exchange for its new risks, the state must protect taxpayers by tighter regulation of any institution too entangled to fail. As Hank Paulson, America\'s treasury secretary, implied this week, the Fed should surely have more power; and its aid should come at a high cost, so banks seek help only as a last resort.
Already there is a bull market in reform proposals—from protecting only “narrow banks” (which restrict their business to safe lines) to controlling bankers\' pay, perhaps even clawing back bonuses if the bank fails. In fact both those ideas show how hard it will be to craft solutions. Narrow banks are even more vulnerable than banks that can spread risk using a portfolio. They do not solve the frailty of entanglement elsewhere in the system—not unless you ban the trading that defines modern finance. As for bankers\' pay, it may have exacerbated the crisis, but how exactly would you regulate it? And what good would it do? Greedy investors and ambitious bankers are quite able to cause crises even without those bonuses.
Instead the regulators should be guided by three precepts. First, principles are better than detailed rules, which can be gamed. Banks lodged vast sums off their balance sheets because they had to obey the intricate codes defining capital adequacy, rather than using their judgment. Second, sound capital is the basis of sound banking. In good times more lending and rising asset values mean that booms feed on themselves. Hence capital requirements should rise during booms and fall in busts. And third, do not ban financial instruments. The pariahs of one age—programme-trading, short-selling, junk bonds—are usually reborn in respectable garb in the next. The system is accident-prone, but it rarely makes the same mistake twice. Take comfort from that if you dare.
国家对投资银行业进行监管
监管在望
让金融家为自己的错误付出代价这种艰巨的任务能把圣彼得本人也累垮。上周这家报纸还在为美联储的决定叫好，因为美联储用300亿美元的公共资金力挺摩根大通收购贝尔史登：这不仅阻止了金融系统的崩溃，也让贝尔史登的投资者来承担主要损失，因为每股收购价只有区区2美元。但到了3月24日，在贝尔史登投资者怨声载道后，摩根大通将收购价提高到10美元每股--这需要付出额外10亿美元左右。纳税人当然会觉得愤愤不平。如果没有美联储帮助，贝尔史登的股东很可能什么都得不到， 但国家是卡在了队伍后排--为贝尔史登最棘手的资产作290亿美元的担保 。
这仅仅是个开始。美联储已有迹象成为贝尔史登那样的投资银行的后盾。它同意给它们提供紧急贷款，这还是自大萧条以来的头一遭。银行类股票价格应声上扬。华尔街上下的才俊们一定又会坐下来讨论如何利用国家的政策为自家谋福利了。
同其他行业一样，金融业的主要监管者也是为自己的行为负责的人。理想的情况下市场就是裁判：虽然不能排除运气因素，总的来说仍然会是成功者致富，失败者倒台。但在风险和回报不对等的情况下你怎么办？当贝尔史登的股东在拿走纳税人的钱的时候呢？或者当其他投资银行家及其股东不把风险当回事的时候呢？因为他们知道赚了都是自己的，亏了却有国家担着。
一个容易的答案是国家应该拒绝伸出援手。但是国家没有太大选择余地：贝尔史登处于如此错综复杂的市场关联之中，让它破产就会连累到很多金融机构，造成成倍的损失。纳税人也许有兴趣援引一般规则，即每个公司都必须是独立的--然而一旦某家公司的倒闭会损害金融系统并威胁到其生存时，这项规则就不再成立了。即使美联储已经尽了本份，帮贝尔史登从摩根大通那里争取到了更好的收购条款，谁也不相信国家会就此放手不管了。就象贝尔史登的桥牌迷主席Jimmy Cayne可能会说的一样，国家拿的就是这样一手牌。
同样容易也同样错误的回答是，只要有足够多的新规则，国家就可以确保危机不再发生。不对，因为5个世纪以来无论经济是繁荣还是萧条，危机总在不断出现。不管政府职员多么尽心尽力，同全球银行家的合力相较仍会是道高一尺魔高一丈。而且银行正是通过承担风险和锐意创新来繁荣经济的（财政也是如此，切记） 。
这就需要监管者把握一种平衡。国家承担了救援新风险，作为交换也就必须保护纳税人，更严格地监管各种金融机构，使它们不致于因为业务过于错综复杂而不能破产。就像本周美国财长Hank Paulson所暗示的那样，美联储应该掌握更多权力；而且要美联储出面相助应当代价高昂，这样银行只有在别无他法时才寻求它的帮助。
各种改革的提议纷至沓来，从只对"窄业银行" （它们将业务控制安全线内）提供保障到控制银行家的收入，甚至在银行倒闭时追回发给员工的奖金。其实这些想法恰恰显示了构思解决方案的难度。相较使用组合分散风险的银行，"窄业银行"更为脆弱。它们并不能消除金融系统内业务交错关联的缺陷--除非你禁止了这种定义了现代金融的交易。银行家薪酬可能确实加剧了危机，但你究竟如何监管它？监管它又会有什么好处？即使没有这些奖金，贪婪的投资者和雄心勃勃的银行家也能制造出危机来。
相反，监管机构应遵循以下三个戒律。首先，原则比细则好，因为银行可以用对策来绕过细则。例如，由于需要遵守资本充足性的相关细则，银行从自己的资产负债表消掉大笔款项，而不是运用自己的判断力。其次，健全的资本是健全的银行的基础。经济景气时期更多的贷款和上升的资产价值意味着繁荣推动着进一步繁荣。因此，资本需求在景气时增加，不景气时则下降。第三，不禁止金融工具的使用。一个时期被人轻视的方法--程序买卖，沽空，垃圾债券--往往在下一时期获得重视和尊敬。金融系统容易发生意外，但它很少重蹈覆辙。你可以这样安慰自己，如果你胆量够大的话。
