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建议 China Makes, The World Takes (5/9)
China Makes, The World Takes
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| FACTORY WORKERS on their way to work in Shenzhen |
One last flow coming into Shenzhen, which makes the other flows possible, is represented by the people at the Four Points: buyers from high-wage countries who have decided that they want to take advantage of, rather than compete with, low-cost Chinese manufacturers. This is where our Mr. China, and others like him, fit in.
This is also where a veil falls. In decades of reporting on military matters, I have rarely encountered people as concerned about keeping secrets as the buyers and suppliers who meet in Shenzhen and similar cities. What information are they committed to protect? Names, places, and product numbers that would reveal which Western companies obtain which exact products from which Chinese suppliers. There are high- and low-road reasons for their concern.
The low-road reason is the “Nike problem.” This is the buyers’ wish to minimize their brands’ association with outsourcing in general and Asian sweatshops in particular, named for Nike’s PR problems because of its factories in Indonesia. By Chinese standards, the most successful exporting factories are tough rather than abusive, but those are not the standards Western customers might apply.
The high-road reason involves the crucial operational importance of the “supply chain.” It is not easy to find the right factory, work out the right manufacturing system, ensure the right supply of parts and raw material, impose the right quality standards, and develop the right relationship of trust and reliability. Companies that have solved these problems don’t want to tell their competitors how they did so. “Supply chain is intellectual property,” is the way Liam Casey put it. Asking a Western company to specify its Chinese suppliers is like asking a reporter to hand over a list of his best sources.
Because keeping the supply chain confidential is so important to buyers, they try to impose confidentiality on their suppliers. When an outside company’s reputation for design and quality is strong—Sony, Braun, Apple—many Chinese contractors like to drop hints that they are part of its supply chain. But the ones who really are part of it must be more discreet if they want to retain the buying company’s trust (and business).
So I will withhold details, but ask you to take this leap: If you think of major U.S. or European brand names in the following businesses, odds are their products come from factories like those I’m about to describe. The businesses are: computers, including desktops, laptops, and servers; telecom equipment, from routers to mobile phones; audio equipment, including anything MP3-related, home stereo systems, most portable devices, and headsets; video equipment of all sorts, from cameras and camcorders to replay devices; personal-care items and high-end specialty-catalog goods; medical devices; sporting goods and exercise equipment; any kind of electronic goods or accessories; and, for that matter, just about anything else you can think of. Some of the examples I’ll give come from sites in Shenzhen, but others are from facilities near Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Xiamen, and elsewhere.
Why does a foreign company come to our Mr. China? I asked Casey what he would tell me if I were in, say, some branch of the steel industry in Pittsburgh and was looking to cut costs. “Not interested,” he said. “The product’s too heavy, and you’ve probably already automated the process, so one person is pushing a button. It would cost you almost as much to have someone push the button in China.”
But what is of intense interest to him, he said, is a company that has built up a brand name and relationships with retailers, and knows what it wants to promote and sell next—and needs to save time and money in manufacturing a product that requires a fair amount of assembly. “That is where we can help, because you will come here and see factories that are better than the ones you’ve been working with in America or Germany.”
Here are a few examples, all based on real-world cases: You have announced a major new product, which has gotten great buzz in the press. But close to release time, you discover a design problem that must be fixed—and no U.S. factory can adjust its production process in time.
The Chinese factories can respond more quickly, and not simply because of 12-hour workdays. “Anyplace else, you’d have to import different raw materials and components,” Casey told me. “Here, you’ve got nine different suppliers within a mile, and they can bring a sample over that afternoon. People think China is cheap, but really, it’s fast.” Moreover, the Chinese factories use more human labor, and fewer expensive robots or assembly machines, than their counterparts in rich countries. “People are the most adaptable machines,” an American industrial designer who works in China told me. “Machines need to be reprogrammed. You can have people doing something entirely different next week.”
中国制造,世界接收(5/9)

深圳。在上班路上的工厂工人。
要说最后一拨来到深圳的人,住在福朋酒店的人是其中代表--没有他们,工人和企业家的涌入便不可能。而他们是来自高收入国家的采购商。他们认为,与其和低成本的中国制造商竞争,倒不如好好加以利用。“中国通”先生,以及其他像他那样的人,便是作这样考虑的。
但这种想法也被蒙上一层神秘的面纱。在深圳或周边城市交易的采购商和供应商,像他们一样严守秘密的人,我报导军事问题几十年了都几乎没碰到过。他们到底严守着什么信息?--是名字、地点和产品--这些信息会透露出哪家西方企业从哪个中国的供应商里买了什么产品。这里面既有正当的原因,也有不那么正当的原因。
其中不正当的原因,就是考虑到“耐克问题”(Nike problem)。这个名称来源于耐克公司因其在印度尼西亚的工厂被曝光而引起的公关危机。它是指采购商们希望尽量减低他们的品牌与他们在亚洲的血汗工厂的联系。从中国的标准来说,那些成功的出口厂家只是对工人要求严苛,而无关虐待。但西方消费者并不是这样认为。
至于正当的理由,则是因为这关系到企业运作中的重要一环--“供应链”。要找到适合的工厂、研究出可行的生产系统、保证零件和原材料的顺利供应、实施合适的产品质量标准、以及建立起可靠的信任关系--这一切都不容易。已经解决好这些问题的企业,并不想和它的竞争对手分享经验。“供应链可是知识产权,” Liam Casey这样说。让一个西方企业指明它在中国的供应商,就像是让一名记者交出一份名单,上面列着他最重要的消息来源。
既然自己的供应链是重要机密,西方企业便试着和他们的供应商订立保密条款。当一个品牌在产品设计和质量上有着很大名气,像是索尼、博朗和苹果,就有很多中国厂家想让人们觉得他们在这些品牌的供应链上。但是那些真正的承造商如果想要保住这些品牌的信任(和生意),那就要更为谨慎了。
所以细节我就不说了,但我想请你来个跳跃性思考:你能想到的那些美国、欧洲大品牌,他们的产品都非常巧地从我将要描述的工厂中生产出来。这些产品有:电脑,包括台式、笔记本和服务器;通讯设备,从路由器到移动电话;音响设备,包括任何与MP3有关的产品、家庭音响系统、大部分便携设备、还有耳机;各种影像设备,从相机、摄像机到播放机;个人护理用品和高档特种商品;医疗设备;体育产品和运动器材;任何种类的电子产品和配件;还有,可以说,任何你能想到的东西。我下面将要提到的工厂,有些是在深圳的,有些则在靠近上海、杭州、广州、厦门和其他城市的地方。
为什么一家外国企业要来找“中国通”先生?我问Casey,假如说我是一家在匹玆堡的钢铁厂,我想要降低成本,你会怎样回答。“没兴趣。”他说。“这种产品太重了。而且你很可能已经让生产自动化了,只需要一个人按一下按钮。在中国,你也要花差不多的钱来让人帮你按这个按钮。”
不过他说,能让他很感兴趣的,是那种已经建立起一个品牌、和零售商搞好了关系、然后也知道自己下一步要推销什么产品的企业--他们的产品需要大量的生产车间,而且要节省生产的时间和花费。“这才是我能帮忙的地方。因为你在这里找到的工厂,会比你已经在美国和德国找到的那些要好很多。”
下面的一些例子,都是真实的案例:你宣布了要推出一项重要的新产品,这引起了媒体的热烈反响。但在产品马上就要上市前,你发现了一个设计上的漏洞,要把它改过来--但没有一家美国工厂能及时调整它的生产流程。
中国的工厂能作出更快的反应,但这并不仅仅因为它们每天工作12个小时。“若在其他地方,你还要入口不同的原材料和零部件,” Casey告诉我。“而在这里,你在方圆一英里内就能找到九家不同的供应商,他们当天下午就能给你送来样品。人们觉得中国的东西‘便宜’,但事实上,我觉得是‘便捷’。” 除此以外,跟那些发达国家的同行相比,中国的工厂使用人力劳动比较多,那些昂贵的机械人和装配机器则用的比较少。“人是最灵活的机器”,一个在中国工作的美国工业设计师告诉我。“机器还要重编程序。但你可以让人下个星期就给你做完全不一样的事情。”

