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建议 A ravenous dragon
China's hunger for natural resources has set off a global commodity boom. Developed countries worry about being left high and dry, but the biggest effects will be felt in China itself, says Edward McBride (interviewed here)
BESIDE the railroad track, between two hillocks of rust-red soil in the midst of Congo's mining belt, three Chinese labourers appear as if from nowhere. There are lots of Chinese around these days, explains one of their compatriots, Harvey Lee, who is driving through the scrub to the nearby copper plant he runs for a Canadian metals firm. On his way, he points out several rudimentary smelters. “That one”, he says, waving at a clump of corrugated-iron sheds and belching chimneys, “is owned by a man from Shanghai.” Moments later, when another ramshackle compound comes into view, he adds, “and that one belongs to two ladies from Hong Kong.” In all, he reckons, Chinese entrepreneurs have set up half of Lubumbashi's 50-odd processing plants.
All around Lubumbashi, the capital of Congo's copper-rich province of Katanga, there are signs of a sudden Chinese invasion. Chinese middlemen have begun buying ore from the area's many wildcat miners and selling it on to processing plants like Mr Lee's. Locals point out several villas in the city's leafy colonial cantonment that are occupied by mysterious Chinese businessmen. Katanga Fried Chicken, hitherto Lubumbashi's most popular restaurant, now has three busy Chinese competitors.
If all goes according to plan, these fledgling businesses will soon be overshadowed by Chinese investment on a much grander scale. In late 2007 the Congolese government announced that Chinese state-owned firms would build or refurbish various railways, roads and mines around the country at a cost of $12 billion, in exchange for the right to mine copper ore of an equivalent value. That sum is more than three times Congo's annual national budget and roughly ten times the aid that the “consultative group” of Western donors has promised the country each year until 2010. The Chinese authorities, it seems, are so anxious to obtain enough minerals to sustain their country's remarkable economic growth that they are willing to invest billions in a dirt-poor and war-torn place like Congo—billions more, in fact, than Western governments and investors combined are putting in.
And Congo is not the only beneficiary of China's hunger for natural resources. From Canada to Indonesia to Kazakhstan, Chinese firms are gobbling up oil, gas, coal and metals, or paying for the right to explore for them, or buying up firms that produce them. Ships are queuing off Australia's biggest coal port, Newcastle, to load cargoes destined for China (pictured above); at one point last June the line was 79 ships long. African and Latin American economies are growing at their fastest pace in decades, thanks in large part to heavy Chinese demand for their resources.
China's burgeoning consumption has helped push the price of all manner of fuels, metals and grains to new peaks over the past year. Even the price of shipping raw materials recently reached a record. Analysts see little prospect of an end to the boom; the prices of a few commodities have fallen on the back of America's worsening economic outlook, but others, including oil, wheat and iron ore, continue to set new records. China, with about a fifth of the world's population, now consumes half of its cement, a third of its steel and over a quarter of its aluminium. Its imports of many natural resources are growing even faster than its bounding economy. Shipments of iron ore, for example, have risen by an average of 27% a year for the past four years. Western mining firms are enjoying a sustained boom.
Unwelcome advances
But China's sudden global reach is generating as much anxiety as prosperity. In 2005 America's congressmen, citing nebulous national-security concerns, scuppered the proposed takeover of Unocal, an American oil firm, by CNOOC, a state-owned Chinese one. The opposition candidate in Zambia's presidential election in 2006 made a point of attacking the growing Chinese presence in the country. Residents of Russia's far east fear that China is planning to plunder their oil and timber and perhaps even to colonise their empty spaces.
Some non-governmental organisations worry that Chinese firms will ignore basic legal, environmental and labour standards in their rush to secure resources, leaving a trail of corruption, pollution and exploitation in their wake. Western companies fret that the Chinese state-owned firms with which they suddenly find themselves competing have an agenda beyond commercial gain. The Chinese government, they say, is willing to pay over the odds for mining or drilling rights to secure access to physical resources. It also intervenes unfairly on its companies' behalf, they claim, by offering big aid packages to countries that welcome Chinese investment. All this, it is feared, will dent the profits of big oil and mining firms, stoke inflation and imperil the West's access to resources that it needs just as much as China does.
Diplomats and pundits, for their part, fear that the West is “losing” Africa and other resource-rich regions. China's sudden prominence, according to this view, will reduce the clout of America, Europe and other rich democracies in the developing world. China will befriend ostracised regimes and encourage them to defy international norms. Corruption, economic mismanagement, repression and instability will proliferate. If this baleful influence spreads too widely, say the critics, the “Washington consensus” of economic liberalism and democracy will find itself in competition with a “Beijing consensus” of state-led development and despotism.
Such fears are not entirely groundless if the recent conduct of some of Congo's neighbours is anything to go by. Angola, to the south, has been receiving so much aid and investment from China that in 2006 it decided it had no need of the International Monetary Fund's billions and all the tiresome requirements for transparency and sound economic management that come with them. Sudan, to the north, has shrugged off Western threats and sanctions over the continuing atrocities in Darfur, thanks in large part to China's readiness to invest in Sudanese oilfields and buy their output. Farther afield, China's eagerness to do business in Myanmar, and its consequent reluctance to chide the tyrannical generals that run the place, helped to prevent a forceful international response to the violent repression of peaceful demonstrations there last year.
Nonetheless, this special report will argue that concerns about the dire consequences of China's quest for natural resources are overblown. China does indeed treat some dictators with kid gloves, but it is hardly alone in that. Its companies do not always uphold the highest standards, but again, many Western firms are no angels either. Fifty years of European and American aid have not succeeded in bringing much prosperity to Africa and other poor but resource-rich places. A different approach from China might yield better results. At the very least it will spur other donors to seek more effective methods.
For all the hue and cry, China is still just one of many countries looking for raw materials around the world. It has won most influence in countries where Western governments were conspicuous by their absence, and where few important strategic interests are at stake. Moreover, as China is becoming more involved in places such as Congo, its policies are beginning to change. It has promised to co-operate with the World Bank in its development efforts in Africa. It no longer seems prepared to back its most objectionable allies in the face of international opprobrium. Its diplomats, for example, did eventually stop parroting their line about unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and allow United Nations peacekeepers to be deployed in Sudan.
The saga over Sudan shows how sensitive the Chinese authorities have become to criticism, despite their impassive reputation. When Steven Spielberg resigned as an adviser to the Beijing Olympics in protest at China's failure to do more about Darfur, a shrill chorus of criticism arose from China's official media—suggesting that such gestures do indeed have an impact.
Chinese companies will inevitably find themselves in fierce competition with Western ones for natural resources, as they must if global markets are to work efficiently. For the most part, however, they do not operate very differently from their peers. To the extent that the Chinese government does subsidise oil production, it helps to bring down the price for everyone else (its subsidies for oil consumption are another matter). As the world's biggest consumer of many commodities, China naturally wants to ensure a steady supply of them to keep its economy going. But markets for commodities are global, and the risk of any one consumer cornering supplies, or securing them at a lower price, is negligible.
Own goal
The worst fallout from China's quest for natural resources will be seen not in the countries they come from, nor in the countries that are competing for supplies, but in China itself. Over the past few years the volume of raw materials it consumes per unit of output has risen sharply. In particular, China has gone from miser to glutton in its use of energy, and is now struggling to diet. That has involved bigger imports of oil, gas and coal, and so more foreign entanglements. But it has also led to the rapid depletion of resources that China cannot import, such as clean air and water.
China is building a huge stock of grimy heavy industry, just as its coastal provinces are getting rich enough to care about the consequences. Protests about environmental issues are on the increase. There is not enough water in the Yellow River basin, which covers a huge swathe of northern China, to supply both farmers and factories. Acid rain from coal-fired power plants is reducing agricultural yields, raising the spectre of increased rural unrest. As it is, the authorities are struggling to ensure that the air will be fit for athletes to breathe at the Olympics in Beijing this summer. All the while, the number of noxious steel mills, cement kilns and power plants relentlessly increases. Global warming, which is fed by their fumes, will make all these problems even worse.
Environmental concerns are unlikely to bring down the Communist regime, or even to stir as much resentment as the arbitrary confiscation of land currently does among China's poorest. But those concerns are certainly prompting the government to reflect on what sort of economic path it wants to pursue. So far, its efforts to temper economic growth, encourage energy efficiency and wean the country off heavy industry have had little effect. But continued failure would eventually make China a less prosperous and more unstable place.
饥饿的巨龙
中国对天然资源的饥饿导致全球商品的繁荣。发达国家担心自我资源陷入困境，但中国自身才将会受最大的影响，Edward McBride说（观看采访点击这里 ）
在刚果采矿区，两座锈红般的土堆间，3名中国劳工突然出现在铁路的一旁。他们的同胞Harvey Lee开着车穿过灌木丛来到附近一个加拿大金属公司拥有的铜厂，他说这些天那儿有许多中国劳工在附近。在路上，他指出几个初级冶炼厂。“那座” ，他边说边示意那座波纹铁棚并且烟囱还在冒烟的工厂，“这属于上海老板”。稍后，当另一座貌似不起眼的建筑物进入视线，他补充说，“那个属于两个来自香港的女老板“。加起来，他估计，中国企业家已占有卢本巴希50多个加工厂的一半。
刚果铜丰富的加丹加省首府卢本巴希，出现中国人突然进入的迹象。中国的中间商已经开始从该地区的许多野矿工购买矿石并出售给像Mr Lee一样的加工厂。当地人指出，在城里植物茂密的殖民地上，许多别墅都被神秘的中国商人拥有。卢本巴希最受欢迎的餐厅加丹加炸鸡，如今有三个中国竞争对手。
如果一切按计划进行，这些新兴企业将会得到中国更大规模的投资。 在2007年年底，刚果政府宣布，中国国有企业将用120亿美元用以建设或翻新全国的各种铁路，公路和煤矿以换取等值的煤矿和铜矿石权利。这笔资金的总和大于3倍以上刚果全年国家预算，大约相当于10倍截止到2010年的西方年平均的援助捐款。中国当局似乎是如此渴望投资数十亿在一个肮脏落后和饱受战争蹂躏的地方，像刚果这样的国家，从而获得足够的矿物质以维持其国家经济的显著增长，事实上，比西方政府和投资者总和还要多数十亿。
刚果并不是唯一一个由于中国自然资源饥饿而饱受利益的国家。从加拿大，印尼到哈萨克斯坦，中国企业大量囤积石油，天然气，煤炭和金属，或支付这些资源的开采权利，或购买生产这些资源的公司。船只在澳大利亚最大的煤炭港口纽卡斯尔排起了队，加载发往中国（上图）的货物; 去年6月的一次，有79船舶排成了队。近几十年来，非洲和拉丁美洲的经济以最快的步伐增长，要多亏了中国对他们资源的大量需求。
在过去的几年间，中国的新兴消费推动各种形式的燃料，金属和谷物的价格到达顶峰。甚至原料的海运费，并且最近达到历史记录。分析家们看不到经济繁荣结束的前景;在美国的经济前景恶化之下，少数商品价格已开始下跌，但其他的，包括石油，小麦和铁矿石，继续创出新的纪录。占世界五分之一人口的中国，现在消耗了世界一半的水泥，三分之一的钢铁和超过四分之一的铝。其许多自然资源的进口速度甚至超过了自身经济发展的速度。举例来说，在过去的四年中，平均每年的海运的铁矿石上升了27％。西方的矿业公司继续享有持续的繁荣。
不受欢迎的前进
但中国突发性的全球战略也产生了巨大的担忧。2005年美国国会议员出于对国家安全的担心，制止中国国有企业中海油接管美国石油企业优尼科。 2006年，赞比亚总统选举的反对党候选人在国内攻击强大的中国的出现。俄罗斯远东地区的居民担心中国正计划去掠夺他们的石油和木材，甚至殖民化他们的空地。
一些非政府组织担心，在争夺资源期间中国企业将有可能无视基本法律，环境和劳工标准来确保资源安全，从而产生腐败现象，污染和剥削。西方国家担心那些突然与自己竞争的中国国有企业有超越商业利益以外的议程。他们说中国政府愿意支付超过赔率的价格来取得开采权，以确保获得物质资源。而且通过对欢迎中国投资的国家提供一揽子援助计划 ，中国政府可以代表其公司不公平的借入。这一切会动摇大石油和采矿公司的利润，他们担心这样会继续助燃通货膨胀并且危及拥有同样资源需求的西方国家获取资源。
外交官和专家们恐怕西方国家正在“失去”非洲和其他资源丰富的地区。根据这种观点，中国的突现会降低美国，欧洲及其他富裕的民主政体在发展中世界的影响。中国将协助受排斥政权，并鼓励他们无视国际准则。腐败，经济管理不善，压迫和不稳定将激增。批评者说，如果这个有害的影响广泛扩散，经济自由主义和民主的“华盛顿共识”会发现自己在与以国家为主导的发展和专制的”北京共识“竞争。
这种担心并非完全空穴来风，如果对刚果的邻国的行为继续持续。2006年，安哥拉以南，已经从中国得到很多的援助和投资，于是它决定不再需要国际货币基金的数十亿的资金，并且放弃那些讨厌的透明度和健全的经济管理的要求。在苏丹以北，摆脱了西方对达尔富尔暴行的威胁和制裁，这在很大程度上得感谢中国的投资，中国准备投资苏丹油田并且购买他们的输出。甚至在缅甸，由于中国对生意的渴望，及其随之不愿谴责那里的专政将领，帮助阻止了对去年发生在那里的暴力镇压和平示威的强烈国际反应。
然而，这份特殊报告也声明对于中国追求自然资源的悲观结果的担心有点过度。中国确实对待一些独裁者小心翼翼，但在这方面中国并不是唯一的国家。中国的公司虽然并不是始终坚持高标准，但同样的，许多西方公司也不是天使。欧洲和美国50年的援助并没有给非洲和那些贫穷但是资源丰富的国家带来繁荣。也许中国采用的不同的方法可能会产生更好的结果。至少它会带动其他捐助者寻求更有效的方法。
面对所有的责难，中国仍然只是许多在世界各地寻找原材料的国家之一。它赢得了那些西方政府忽略或者有很少战略意义的国家的影响。此外，由于中国已经正在越来越多地参与像刚果那样政策开始改变的国家。它已答应与世界银行合作共同发展非洲。在面对国际谴责，它似乎不再愿意回到其最令人反感的盟国。举例来说，其外交官最终停止不断反对对一个主权国家内部事务的无端干涉，并允许联合国维和人员部署在苏丹。
尽管中国冷漠的声誉，在苏丹问题上的举动显示了中国当局对于批评是多么的敏感。当作为北京奥运会顾问的史蒂芬斯皮尔伯格因为抗议中国在达尔富尔问题上的失败而辞职，尖锐的批评出现在中国的官方媒体，暗示这种举动确实有一定的影响。
如果全球市场要提高效率，中国公司将无可避免地发现自己与西方企业正在进行对自然资源激烈竞争。然而在许多的方面，他们与同行们的运作方式非常不同。从某种程度上说，中国政府补贴石油生产，对于其他所有人有利于降低价格（补贴石油消费是另一回事）。作为世界上最大商品消费国，中国自然要确保资源的稳定供应以保持其经济持续。但对于商品来说，市场是全球性的，任何一个消费国对于供给的垄断或确保供给维持低价的风险都是微不足道的。
自我目标
中国对自然资源的需求而产生的附带结果既不存在于资源输出国，也不存在于为供给而竞争的国家中，而是在中国本身。在过去的几年中，中国每单位产出的原材料消耗量急剧上升。特别是在能源使用上，中国已经从守财奴到贪食者，并正在减能中挣扎着。这就要涉及到更多的石油，天然气和煤炭等的进口，进而更多与外国牵连。但也导致了一些中国不能进口的资源的快速耗竭，如清新的空气和水。
中国正在建设一个巨大的灰暗重工业，正如它的沿海省份正在不断致富以应对随之而来的后果。对环境问题的抗议正在增加。覆盖中国北方大面积地区的黄河流域已经没有足够的水供应农民和工厂。从燃煤电厂产生的酸雨正在减少农业收成率，农村动荡局面正在不断扩大。因为污染，当局正竭尽全力来确保这次北京夏季奥运会的空气适合运动员呼吸。同时，有毒的钢厂，水泥窑及发电厂的数量还在不断增加。由于他们的烟气导致的全球气候变暖将使所有这些问题变得更为恶劣。
环境问题和因为目前对中国穷人任意没收土地而产生的愤恨是不可能打垮或搅乱共产党的政权的。但这些问题定然促使政府考虑他们究竟是要追寻什么样的经济道路。目前为止，对放缓经济增长，鼓励节能降耗和使国家放弃对重工业的依赖做出的努力还收效甚微。但持续的失败，最终会使得中国成为次繁荣和更不稳定的地方。
