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金牌译作 哲学与《黑客帝国》——梦之怀疑论

890个读者 翻译: paradox  04/04/2008 原文 引用 双语对照及眉批

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Dream Skepticism

 

Morpheus:

Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was real?

Morpheus:

What if you were unable to wake from that dream, Neo? How would you know the difference between the dreamworld and the real world?  

 

Neo has woken up from a hell of a dream — the dream that was his life. How was he to know? The cliché is that if you are dreaming and you pinch yourself, you will wake up. Unfortunately, things aren\'t quite that simple. It is the nature of most dreams that we take them for reality — while dreaming we are unaware that we are in fact in a dreamworld. Of course, we eventually wake up, and when we do we realize that our experience was all in our mind. Neo\'s predicament makes one wonder, though: how can any of us be sure that we have ever genuinely woken up? Perhaps, like Neo prior to his downing the red pill, our dreams thus far have in fact been dreams within a dream.

The idea that what we take to be the real world could all be just a dream is familiar to many students of philosophy, poetry, and literature. Most of us, at one time or another, have been struck with the thought that we might mistake a dream for reality, or reality for a dream. Arguably the most famous exponent of this worry in the Western philosophical tradition is the seventeenth-century French philosopher Rene Descartes. In an attempt to provide a firm foundation for knowledge, he began his Meditations by clearing the philosophical ground through doubting all that could be doubted. This was done, in part, in order to determine if anything that could count as certain knowledge could survive such rigorous and systematic skepticism. Descartes takes the first step towards this goal by raising (through his fictional narrator) the possibility that we might be dreaming:

"How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events — that I am here in my dressing gown, sitting by the fire —when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I look at this piece of paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be asleep." (Meditations, 13)

When we dream we are often blissfully ignorant that we are dreaming. Given this, and the fact that dreams often seem as vivid and "realistic" as real life, how can you rule out the possibility that you might be dreaming even now, as you sit at your computer and read this? This is the kind of perplexing thought Descartes forces us to confront. It seems we have no justification for the belief that we are not dreaming. If so, then it seems we similarly have no justification in thinking that the world we experience is the real world. Indeed, it becomes questionable whether we are justified in thinking that any of our beliefs are true.

The narrator of Descartes\' Meditations worries about this, but he ultimately maintains that the possibility that one might be dreaming cannot by itself cast doubt on all we think we know; he points out that even if all our sensory experience is but a dream, we can still conclude that we have some knowledge of the nature of reality. Just as a painter cannot create ex nihilo but must rely on pigments with which to create her image, certain elements of our thought must exist prior to our imaginings. Among the items of knowledge that Descartes thought survived dream skepticism are truths arrived at through the use of reason, such as the truths of mathematics: "For whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more than four sides." (14)

While such an insight offers little comfort to someone wondering whether the people and objects she confronts are genuine, it served Descartes\' larger philosophical project: he sought, among other things, to provide a foundation for knowledge in which truths arrived at through reason are given priority over knowledge gained from the senses. (This bias shouldn\'t surprise those who remember that Descartes was a brilliant mathematician in addition to being a philosopher.) Descartes was not himself a skeptic — he employs this skeptical argument so as to help remind the reader that the truths of mathematics (and other truths of reason) are on firmer ground than the data provided to us by our senses.

Despite the fact that Descartes\' ultimate goal was to demonstrate how genuine knowledge is possible, he proceeds in The Meditations to utilize a much more radical skeptical argument, one that casts doubt on even his beloved mathematical truths. In the next section we will see that, many years before the Wachowskis dreamed up The Matrix, Descartes had imagined an equally terrifying possibility.

Further Reading:

Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Blackwell, 1985.

Descartes.
The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge University Press, 1984

Stroud, Barry.
The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford, 1984.

哲学与《黑客帝国》——梦之怀疑论

 

Morpheus

Neo,你是否曾经做过一个梦,一个你坚信它是现实的一个梦?

 

Morpheus

Neo,如果你不能从那个梦中醒过来怎么办?你如何来区分梦幻世界和现实世界之间的区别?

 

Neo从一个可怕的梦中醒来,那个梦曾一度就是他的生活。他是怎么知道的?有一种老掉牙的说法说,如果你在梦中捏自己一下,你就会醒过来。不幸的是,事情没有那么简单。让我们误以为它是真实的,这是大多数梦境的一种本质属性——在梦中我们并不知道自己身处梦幻世界。当然,我们最后还是会醒来的。而当我们醒来时,我们意识到自己在梦中的经历全部存在于自己的大脑中。然而,Neo身处的困境让我们想问:我们怎么能确定自己曾经真正地醒来过一次?或许,就像Neo在吞下红色药丸前一样,我们迄今为止的梦境实际上都是梦中梦。

 

我们所承认的现实世界有可能只是个梦境,这种理念对于学习哲学、诗歌和文学的学生来说并不陌生。我们中的大多数都曾经有过这么一种想法:我们可能将一个梦境误认为是现实,或者将现实误认为是梦境。在西方哲学传统中对于这种担忧的一个最著名的倡导者或许是17世纪的法国哲学家笛卡尔(Rene Descartes)。在试图为知识建立坚实基础的尝试中,他开始通过怀疑一切能被怀疑的对象来理清哲学立场,以这样的方式开始了《第一哲学沉思录》的创作。从某些角度来说,这样做是为了评定,在如此严格而系统的怀疑论之下,是否有任何事物能被算作是可以确信的知识。笛卡尔迈向这个目标的第一步是通过(用他虚构出来的叙述者)提出我们可能正处在一个梦境中的可能性:

 

“在夜晚沉睡时,我曾经多少次对那些熟悉的事情深信不疑——我正穿着晨袍,坐在壁炉边——可事实上我正赤身躺在床上!然而此时此刻当我看着这张纸的时候,我的眼睛绝对是清醒的;我摇摇脑袋,它并没有睡着;我能够感觉到自己故意伸展的手,而且我知道自己在做什么。所有这些对于一个睡着的人来说不会显得如此清晰。确实!而我似乎忘记了,在其它场合下,我也曾在睡梦中被同样的想法欺骗!当我更仔细地思考这个问题时,我清楚地看到,根本没有任何可靠的迹象能够将醒着和睡着区分开来。其结果就是,我开始觉得晕眩,而这种感觉更加深了我有可能正在梦中这一想法。”(《第一哲学沉思录》,第十三章) 

 

当我们做梦的时候我们总是很幸运的对于自己正在梦境中这一事实一无所知。正因如此,再加上梦境往往看上去和现实生活一样鲜活和“真实”,你如何才能排除即使现在当你坐在电脑前阅读这篇文章的时候,自己依然处于梦境之中的可能性呢?这正是笛卡尔迫使我们面对的那种令人费解的想法。似乎我们没有很好的理由可以证明自己现在不是在做梦。如果这样,那么似乎我们同样没有很好的理由认为我们经历的世界是现实世界。是的,就连我们是否有充足的理由认为任何自己相信的信仰是正确的都开始变得可疑。

 

笛卡尔《第一哲学沉思录》中的叙述者对此感到担忧,但是他最终坚持认为,我们可能正处于梦境中的可能性并不能让我们怀疑我们知道的一切;他指出,即使我们所有的感官经验都只是一个梦,我们还是可以断定自己仍拥有一些真实的知识。正如一位画家不能从虚无中创造,而必须依靠颜料来创造她的形象,我们思想中的某些元素必须在我们开始想象之前存在。笛卡尔认为,能在梦之怀疑论下残存下来的知识包含了通过推理得出的真理,例如数学中的真理:“无论我是醒着的还是睡着了,2+3永远等于5,而一个正方形必然只有4条边。”(《第一哲学沉思录》,第14章)

 

尽管这种见解对于那些想知道自己遇到的人和物是否真实的人来说并不能提供多少安慰,但是它正好服务于笛卡尔的一个更大的哲学工程:他在其他事物中试图寻找一种知识的基础:通过推理获得的真理要优先于通过感官得到的知识。(笛卡尔除了是哲学家之外也是一位杰出的数学家,对于还记得这点的人来说以上这种偏见应该并不让人惊讶。)笛卡尔自己并不是一位怀疑论者——他用这种怀疑的论据来提醒读者们,数学上的真理(以及其他推理的真理)要比我们通过感官得来的数据更加可靠。

 

虽然笛卡尔最终的目标是要证明知识究竟能有多真实,他在《第一哲学沉思录》中继续利用了一种更加极端的怀疑论的论据,甚至连他至爱的数学真理都开始被他怀疑。在下一节中我们将会看到,在比Wachowskis开始构思《黑客帝国》早很多年之前,笛卡尔就已经想象到了一种同样恐怖的可能性。

 

 

 

 

深入阅读:

 

Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Blackwell, 1985.

Descartes.The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge University Press, 1984

Stroud, Barry.The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford, 1984.

 


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